The Malawi Kwacha was floated in February 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi has periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. This paper analyses the effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions carried out by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. We use a GARCH (1, 1) model to simultaneously estimate the effect of intervention on the mean and volatility of the Malawi kwacha. Using monthly exchange rates and official intervention data from January 2002 to February 2006, the empirical results suggest that intervention activities of the Reserve Bank of Malawi affect the kwacha. In line with similar findings elsewhere in the literature, the paper finds that net sales of dollars by the Reserve Bank of Malawi depreciate, rather than appreciate, the kwacha.
Introduction
Most central banks, especially in developing countries use foreign exchange market intervention 2 as a policy tool for macroeconomic stabilization. In Malawi, the exchange rate was floated in February, 1994. Since then, the Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) has periodically intervened in the foreign exchange market. In line with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditions under the structural adjustment package, the RBM has also intervened to buy foreign exchange in order to build up reserves for the Government and moderate exchange rate fluctuations.
There has been a lot of debate in literature on the question of whether these interventions affect the value of the kwacha. The main objective of the study is to examine the efficacy of the official intervention in foreign exchange market.
Basically, the paper tries to answer the following questions: Floatation of the kwacha was intended to be market determined, but has it really been market determined? Has intervention influenced movements of the kwacha? Has intervention dampened and smoothened the volatility of the Malawi kwacha? What is the role of the balance of payments pressures on the direction and volatility of the Malawi kwacha?
The issue of the effect of intervention on the exchange market in Malawi is significant on both research and policy fronts. Research front, because very few such papers have been done on Africa and only one is known to the authors. It is of policy interest because, if sterilized intervention has an effect on the kwacha, this offers the monetary authorities an additional policy tool independent from general monetary policy.
In Section 2, we discuss monetary and exchange rate policy in Malawi. Section 3 gives theoretical underpinnings and reviews recent results in recent contributions to empirical literature on effectiveness of central bank interventions. Section 4 outlines the methodology used in the paper. Section 5 summaries the main findings of our empirical research. Section 6 concludes the paper and offers some policy recommendations. 2 Iintervention refers to official sales or purchases of foreign exchange to influence exchange rate. In this paper, we have used net sales of foreign exchange as our intervention variable. The choice of monetary policy stance adopted by a country, by and large, depends on the economic, financial and institutional environment within which the policy is operating. Currently, Reserve Bank of Malawi (RBM) pursues a monetary targeting regime, whereby the authorities aim at regulating money stock (broad money, M2), to levels required to support the relationship between price level and output. Broad money stock (M2), therefore is a nominal anchor to control inflation. Open market type operations remain the primary policy levers to influence liquidity. The objective of monetary policy is to reduce inflationary pressures by bringing inflation to the neighbourhood of 5-8 percent over the medium term. In this range, inflation is deemed less likely to distort savings and investment decisions. The conduct of monetary policy is under the overall leadership of the Monetary Policy Committee, which meets once in a month to take stock of the performance of the economy vis-àvis the economic program and takes a view on the expected level of inflation in the short to medium term. On the basis of its assessment, the Committee gives broad guidelines to the Open Market Desk of the Bank on what it views as the appropriate reserve money target by the end of the month or quarter. The information given is consistent with monetary policy targets. The Open Market Desk uses this information and other available information such as expected sales and purchases of foreign exchange by the Bank, maturities and new issues of Treasury bills and Government expected revenue and expenditure to map out a path for monetary policy intervention for the month.
Monetary and Exchange

Monetary Policy Targeting
The Reserve Bank of Malawi attempts to directly control money stock through a number of instruments. Although the RBM has a statutory responsibility to achieve a low and stable inflation at predetermined level for a given time, the nature of its functions make inflation targeting not an option. Inflation targeting requires some level of independence of the RBM, a high degree of cooperation between the Bank on the one hand and the Government, private sector and trade unions on the other.
In order to achieve the price stability objective, the Bank exerts stricter controls over reserve money, employing for this purpose quarterly growth targets (usaully agreed with the International Monetary Fund under the supported programmes). While more emphasis was initially put on growth in M2 aggregate, recent developments have indicated that M2 can better be influenced by monitoring growth in reserve money aggregate because the central bank has better control over the latter than the M2 money stock.
In order to influence growth in the money stock, the central bank increases or decreases the amount of reserve money by managing both the domestic and foreign sources of reserve money (credit from the central bank, and acquisition of foreign exchange by the Bank that has impact on local money creation). The central bank's daily monetary management involves making estimates of banking system liquidity situations. Based on the outcome, the central bank decides how to intervene i.e. inject or withdraw liquidity from the system.
In line with direct monetary control, RBM manages monetary conditions in the economy by using three main instruments namely the bank (discount) rate, Liquidity
Reserve Requirement (LRR), and Open Markets Operations (OMO).
Bank or Discount Rate
The bank rate or discount rate is the rate at which the Reserve Bank charges on funds borrowed from it by commercial banks and the government. The rate imposes limitations on the capacity to borrow from the central bank. tended to influence lending rates in the financial system. Operationally, borrowing by banks is done through standing facilities window. RBM discount window was established in line with the 'lender-of-last-resort' role. Accordingly, it has continued to provide loans of a short-term nature (overnight) to banks in need of liquidity.
Recently, repurchase agreements have been used quite often in order to fine-tune banking system's liquidity. A commercial bank may borrow funds for a period of 7 days maximum. The discount rate is also a penalty rate as it is usually above the market rates to discourage banks.
Liquidity Reserve Requirement (LRR)
LRR is one of the instruments available to RBM for controlling base money. LRR works by affecting the proportion of assets that banks are required to hold, and hence their ability to expand liquidity. In Malawi, all commercial banks are subject to the LRR requirement on all their domestic liabilities, and discount houses on all their collateralized deposits. Failure to oblige by the requirement attracts a penalty from the RBM.
LRR was first applied in 1989. Initially, commercial banks were required to maintain a minimum equal to 20 percent of their total local currency deposits (including government deposits). In1995, the LRR was increased to 35 percent. In June 2004, the rate was adjusted downwards to 27.5 percent to-date with the callable deposits also adjusted to 14.5 percent.
The use of the LRR is limited, as focus has tilted more to open market operations (OMO). The LRR remains generally high and this has adverse implications in the conduct of monetary policy. In effect the high LRR is regarded as an implicit tax on these institutions equivalent to interest rates that they could have earned on these balances. This implicit tax on reserves when adjusted for other intermediation costs partly explains the wide spread between deposit and lending rates.
But the authorities could not just ascribe to the idea of maintaining a lower LRR as its reduction could fuel inflationary pressures unless it is offset by other monetary instruments like aggressive sales of securities. It is against this reason that RBM did not fully comply with its previously announced LRR reduction scheme in 2004.
Cumulative monetary overhang led to suspension of the scheme.
Open Market Operations (OMO)
Open Market Operations involves the deliberate buying and selling of paper by RBM to inject and withdraw liquidity from the financial system. OMO is conducted through RBM bills and repurchase agreements (repos) using Treasury bills as the major monetary policy instruments. Of the two, the RBM bills are the most commonly used. Prior to RBM bills, Treasury bills were issued for monetary policy purposes in addition to government finance. The Reserve Bank assumed responsibility over monetary Treasury bills and the proceeds were frozen till maturity.
But in view of policy conflicts that arise from government debt management and monetary policy needs through issuance of Treasury bills for dual considerations (monetary and fiscal), the monetary policy Treasury bills were gradually phased out.
Since 2000, RBM has been conducting OMO through primary market auctions of RBM bills. Since 2000, RBM has been conducting open market type operations through primary market auctions for liquidity management purposes to meet its reserve money targets.
Challenges to execution of monetary policy
Monetary targeting in Malawi, however, faces some problems such as non-guaranteed expectation that the relationship between the supply of money and inflation is stable and predictable. This is manifest in the apparent missing of targets more frequently.
But despite being imprecise, the relationship has been judged to be sufficiently stable to serve as a useful guide to policy. This therefore justifies the medium term inflation objective of 5-8 percent.
Fiscal overruns have been associated with monetization of the deficit, crowding-out of credit to the private sector and worsening inflation position. Associated with fiscal overruns also, have been massive increases in banking system credit, especially in the context of donors curtailing support because of concerns about governance. In simple terms, fiscal expansion and the related large fiscal deficits have affected the efficacy of monetary policy. With the collapse of the gold standard par value system the major currencies, the British sterling included, in the currency market became very volatile as these currencies shifted from pegging to the gold to a generalized floating system. From 1992 . Progressively, it became apparent that the exchange rate was becoming heavily politicized, with each devaluation becoming subject of intense speculation within the private sector. That led to weakening the level of confidence in the exchange system, and consequently a marked slowdown in repatriation of export proceeds. The situation was worsened by the cut in non-humanitarian assistance by bilateral donors and suspension of balance of payments support in 1992 because of governance issues.
The Floatation of the kwacha
In February 1994 Malawi adopted a managed float exchange rate regime. This was aimed at resolving the foreign exchange crisis that had hit the country due to suspension of balance of payments support from donors, and the lagged effects of the 1992/93 drought. The switch from the fixed regime to the floating one was meant to achieve certain objectives which can be summed up as:
i. Improvement of the country's export competitiveness,
ii. Provision of an efficient foreign exchange allocation mechanism
iii. Dampen speculative attacks on the Kwacha. Prior to the floatation, devaluations had become more frequent and very predictable thereby making the whole system very unstable.
iv. Restoration of investor and donor confidence. The country's foreign reserves had dwindled to such low levels that it was difficult to do business with the rest of the world.
As a step towards market determination of the exchange rate, the monetary authorities authorized creation of a foreign exchange market administered by the RBM where weekly auctions of the foreign exchange market would take place. Buyers of the foreign exchange would bid through the commercial banks the price at which they wanted to buy a certain amount of foreign exchange. In the same way, sellers would determine their selling price and amounts. Successful bidders would then pay their bidding prices and not the clearing rate. This, therefore, was adoption of a managed float exchange rate regime. Consequently, the exchange rate of the Kwacha against the US dollar depreciated from around K4.5 to over K17 during the period February to September 1994.
The Crawling band
During the period 1995-97 the exchange rate fluctuated within a very narrow fixed band and accordingly foreign reserves were used to support the exchange rate. The main objective of attaining low inflation rates was achieved towards the end of 1997 but at the expense of huge foreign exchange reserves and high interest rates, which were used to support the exchange rate. Consequently, the real exchange rate appreciated and had a negative impact on the current account balance. In other words the current account imbalance that emerged during the period of fixed exchange rates was being covered by a run down of reserves.
An unannounced crawling peg
After achieving the inflation objective during 1997, the target of the monetary authorities was then to revive the lost competitiveness within a reasonable period of time. It soon became clear that the narrow band had to be abandoned in favour of an unannounced crawling peg. During this period, the authorities were not committed to defend the currency thus the central parity rate was adjusted every time the maximum level (i.e. the upper limit of the band) was reached. Thus between 1997 and 1998 the exchange rate moved from around K15 to K38 to the US dollar.
The 'free-floating' system
This adjustment in the exchange rate brought back some competitiveness in the country's foreign trade. Consequently, the system was abandoned towards the end of 1998 and the exchange rate started operating in a more market fashion -i.e. the 'free- expected, also contributed much to the stability of the kwacha as these supported the foreign exchange reserve position. Finally, the recovery in the countries affected by the Asian crisis also helped achieve stability in the exchange rate as currencies of major trading partners stabilized. Notwithstanding these positive developments, the kwacha also came under pressure as the inflation differential between Malawi and her trading partners increased. In addition, the seasonal increase in demand for foreign exchange towards the end of the year also exerted a downward pressure on the currency. Reflecting these developments, the external value of the Malawi kwacha dropped by 6.5 percent against the US dollar between January and December, 1999.
In 1999 The free-float system, is perhaps remembered by the first ever appreciation of the This follows an agreement between the two parties after their Reserve Bank-brokered discussions earlier this year. The farmers are now able to get their proceeds within 24 hours of the sale documents being submitted to their bankers and the exchange rate used in the conversion is the one displayed on the day of the sale.
The Current Exchange Rate Policy
The current managed float exchange rate system was adopted in response to many economic challenges like persistent excess demand for foreign exchange, frequent droughts and market failures, among others, which rendered the free float system ineffective. The exchange rate is aligned with major objectives, that is, maintaining a 
Foreign Exchange Market Intervention
The medium term objective of the Reserve Bank is to have the kwacha fully market determined and build foreign exchange reserves, but at the same time the monetary authorities do recognize the importance to investors, of a predictable currency value.
In a liberalized foreign exchange market, the RBM cannot dictate the value of the Malawi kwacha. However, the RBM can only influence the value of the kwacha by buying foreign exchange when there is an excess supply in the market and selling when there is shortage. This means that in theory, the RBM can maintain a stable exchange rate by intervening in foreign exchange market. In practice, however, the RBM has to consider the monetary implications as well as implications on the position of official foreign reserves. As the Bank buys foreign exchange from the market, the supply of the Malawi kwacha in the economy increases and this has potential for inflationary pressures. For the Reserve Bank to sell foreign exchange to the market, it must have adequate reserves in the first place. And, as a source of its own foreign exchange reserves, the Reserve Bank also relies on whatever it is able to buy from the market and/or, if there were any inflows of donor funds. Any constraints on these two sources, means inadequate capacity for the Bank to support the market effectively, thereby affecting the surplus/demand balance in the market. Inter-bank activity was much lower however, more than 75 percent of which was characterized by official intervention.
The Parallel Market
The parallel market has existed for a long time. This market exists to meet the needs of foreign exchange customers whose needs cannot be satisfied in the authorized dealer banks (ADBs) or bureaus. Continuation of activities in the parallel market reflects that there are distortions in the official market and its exchange rates should reflect the actual market rates. The activities in this market cannot objectively be measured; however, the gap between the bureau exchange rates and the parallel rates is not very large. The rates also tend to be stable following the movements in the official exchange rates. The parallel market is preferred because it allows for faster purchase or selling of foreign exchange without disclosing much information.
However, there is a high risk associated with dealing with operators in this market mainly associated with obtaining the local or foreign currencies that are not genuine and if the law catches with money changer, then prosecution will follow. This has made it difficult to obtain any information regarding operations in this market Participants in the parallel market are not defined, especially as there is no legal recognition accorded to operators and there are no direct regulations, however there seem to be a lot of information sharing among dealers in this market. Usually the exchange rates in this market are similar among dealers in different places within the city of Lilongwe, for example and between the dealers in different cities of the country. The only marked difference in rates exist between dealers in major cities and those at the borders with neighbouring countries, with the latter having lower rates in most cases than the former.
Establishment of Foreign Exchange Bureaus
In order to incorporate parallel market into the legal foreign exchange system in Malawi, foreign exchange bureaus were granted permission to operate from mid 1990s. Operators in the bureau de change are private entrepreneurs who have been formally recognized by government to deal in foreign exchange and provide access to foreign exchange in a convenient and informal manner.
Foreign exchange is primarily sourced from private individuals, including businesses people who are unable to deal at authorized dealer banks. From their inception there has been a general movement of exchange rates in the bureaus de changes towards that of parallel market. By June 2004, while the official rate was K108.8858 per US dollar, the bureau de change exchange rate and parallel rate were K110.0000 and K118.0000, respectively (see below). This trend continued, with the explanation for this as excess demand for foreign exchange in the foreign exchange market eventually transferred to the bureau de change to attract higher prices. Again, the very simple nature of transactions in this market compared with the foreign exchange market plus relative lower risk -e.g fake currency transactions -to the parallel market, make it attractive for consumers to prefer dealing with bureau de changes operators. This drives up demand and, consequently, the exchange rate. should however be noted that the suggestion that parallel rate is the optimal rate is controversial. Given the fact that the official market's share of the foreign exchange market is much larger, the realistic market rate may lie somewhere between the official exchange rate and parallel market rate. The increasing gap between official exchange rate and parallel exchange rate justifies some analyst's view that the Malawi kwacha is overvalued. Even though all markets are imperfect, the official market is the leading market. 
Sterilized intervention
There is general agreement in literature that unsterilized sale of foreign exchange would be expected, other things being equal, to appreciate the exchange rate through contraction of money supply and therefore interest rates. Sterilized intervention is where the authorities take deliberate action to offset foreign exchange market intervention with an equal change in the net domestic credit and this happens either simultaneously or with some short lag, while leaving interest rates unchanged. On the other hand, intervention is non-sterilized when it is conducted without any action taken to offset the impact of intervention. The relationship between exchange rates and monetary control largely comes from central banks balance sheet. On the liabilities side, there is the base money (BM) which comprises reserves, currency and the central bank's net worth. On the assets aside, there is net foreign assets (NFA) and net domestic assets (NDA). Any intervention in the foreign exchange market will change NFA (Simatele, 2004) . Assuming that net worth is insignificant, a summary of the balance sheet can be presented as: 
∆BM = ∆NFA
The size of sterilization largely depends on the extent to which simultaneous changes take place in NDA as NFA changes (Simatele, 2004) . Full sterilization happens when changes in NFA are totally offset by changes in NDA, thus the expression:
-∆NFA = ∆NDA and ∆BM = 0
In this case there would be no impact on the monetary base. The changes will eventually result into changes in broader money aggregates and interest rates. This in consequent will affect expectations, capital inflows and eventually the exchange rate.
Sterilised intervention 5 can affect exchange rate through two channels. These are the portfolio balance channel and the signaling channel. 5 The Reserve Bank of Malawi sterilizes its foreign exchange market intervention whenever it is perceived that intervention in foreign exchange market will affect reserve money targets to the extent that the targets will be missed.
Since, money targets are usually tight; the Bank therefore often sterilizes its foreign exchange market intervention.
The Portfolio Balance Channel
This one states that sterilising intervention through typical open market operations will change the currency composition of government securities held by the public (Humpage, 2003) . A sterilised purchase of foreign exchange, for example, increases the amount held domestic bonds held by the public relative to foreign bonds, resulting in a depreciation of the local currency. Unfortunately, most empirical studies find the relationship to be statistically insignificant. The reason offered for the lack of a portfolio effect is that the typical intervention transaction is minor relative to the stock of outstanding assets. Dominguez (1998) is a notable exception to this conclusion.
Signalling Channel
The second channel is the signalling or expectations channel. Mussa (1981) suggested (1997) has formalised Mussa's approach and has demonstrated that if the signal is not fully realistic, or if the market does not use all available information, then the response of the exchange rate intervention ill be low. However, Edison (1993) argues that intervention is effective and occurs through both the portfolio balance and signalling channels.
Profit Criterion
This one states that if official intervention yields a profit, it will reduce unnecessary exchange rate fluctuations. It is stabilising. If intervention entails losses, it becomes an additional source of exchange rate instability. This criterion is based on static view that of equilibrium exchange rate, which must be computed in the first place. The profit criteria also takes into account interest differential. Andrew and Broadbent (1994) in their work on the effectiveness of official intervention in the Australian dollar market found out that in the first ten years of the floatation of the Australian dollar (1983 -94) the Reserve Bank of Australia foreign exchange operations resulted in the stability of the Australian dollar. Makin and Shaw (1997) concluded that the official intervention during 1983-93 had neither influenced the Australian dollar nor smoothened its volatility. Bonser -Neal et al. (1998) and Humpage (1999) show that the interventions undertaken together with changes in the federal funds rate do not have any effect on exchange rates. Both results attribute exchange rate responses mainly to the federal funds rate. However Kearns and Rogobon (2002) support the view that over the period 1986-93, RBA intervention did have an economically significant effect in moving the level of exchange rate. Using daily data covering the 1983-97 period, Kim and Sheen (2002) and Kim, Kortian and Sheen (2002) conclude that the RBA was cautious in choosing when to intervene and that its intervention stabilised the volatility of Australian dollar. In contrast, Kim The explanation supports the 'speculative bandwagon' and a 'leaning against the wind' strategy. Although there is no attempt to distinguish through which channel intervention works, she argues that this is more likely to be a signalling affect rather that a portfolio balance.
Empirical Findings
Many researchers also consider the second moment of the exchange rate process finding that intervention typically increases currency volatility. They often interpret this finding has evidence of a destabilising effect, but in a market that has information imperfections, volatility may be associated with transmission of new information. If so, one would expect an increase in exchange rate volatility around intervention periods.
Methodology
In both macroeconomic and financial economics, empirical research is based on time series, and time series is generally viewed as stochastic processes. The model builder is therefore allowed to use statistical inference in developing and testing equations that describe the relationships between economic variables. The two key properties of 
Alternative approaches
In this study we considered a number of approaches to modelling foreign exchange market intervention and economic responses.
Event study: an incident of intervention is defined as a period of days with official intervention in foreign exchange in one direction, including up to ten days of no further intervention between the initial and subsequent intervention transaction. It requires systematic intervention transactions (Humpage, 1999) . A quick look at
Malawi's experience shows that intervention transactions are not systematic. It takes long periods between one official purchase or sale of foreign exchange to the next.
VAR models: structural VAR models have been used to identify dynamic responses of an economy to particular shocks and this reveals the information about the dynamic properties of the economy that is being investigated. The results can be used to inform policy makers and economic forecasters how economic variables such as exchange rate and prices respond over time to changes in policy or other events.
However, the discrete values and periodic nature of intervention make it difficult to estimate parameter values of reaction functions in a VAR (Kim, 2003) .
Econometric model: lagged models are inappropriate since intervention appears to affect exchange rate movements within minutes and hours (Humpage, 1999) .
The GARCH/ARCH models: ARCH Volatility in asset returns and exchange rates tend to gather around their marginal distributions. Modelling such time varying volatility was initiated by Robert Engel through autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH). In order to go around this problem Bollerslev (1986) proposed a generalised ARCH or GARCH (p, q) model. This is the model we adopt in this study, it is particularly favoured to take account of variance correlations typically found in financial data. The Generalised Autoregressive Conditional
Heteroskedastic (GARCH) model is robust to various types of misspecification, can simultaneously model conditional mean and conditional (Edison, 1999) .
The adopted methodology
We adopt the GARCH methodology. The first-order (p=q=1) GARCH model, suggested by Taylor (1986) , has since become the most popular ARCH model in practice. Compared to the Engel's basic ARCH model, the GARCH model is a useful improvement that allows a parsimonious specification. The GARCH (p, q) model on which the study is based takes the form:
where α 0 >0, α i ≥0 for i=1,2, …., q and b≥0 for i=1,2,….,p. The GARCH (p, q) model successfully captures several characteristics of financial time series such as volatility.
The study estimates and tests ARCH models, that is, builds the ARCH into GARCH (p, q) model using the Eviews. Initially we regress y on x by OLS and obtain the residuals {ε t }; then we compute the OLS regression ε 2 t =α 0 +α 1 ε 2 t +…+α p ε 2 t-p +error;
and test the joint significance of α … α 1 . The hypothesis of interest is the extent to which changes in the conditional mean and conditional variance are associated with changes in the intervention variable. The general formulation of the model follows Edison and Liang (1999) ; but adjusted to suit the Malawi situation:
Where ∆EX t = log change in Malawi kwacha/United States dollar (MK/US$), NS is net sales of foreign exchange (representing intervention), PDRSA is inflation differential between Malawi and Republic of South Africa (RSA), EP is parallel exchange rate premium, DMV is dummy variable for seasonal trends in exchange rates, ε is a regression disturbance (forecast error), ⏐⏐is absolute value operator, I t-1 is information set through time t-1 , h is the time-varying variance ofε. the ARCH and GARCH terms, respectively. The ARCH term (ε 2 t-1 ) measures volatility from previous period measured as a lag of the squared residual from the mean equation. The GARCH term (h t-1 ) measures the last period's forecast variance.
Data
We use monthly data series which includes exchange rate (EX), net sales of foreign exchange as intervention variable (NS), inflation differential between Malawi and RSA (PDRSA), parallel exchange rate premium (EP) and dummy variable for seasonality in exchange rate developments (DMV). We use nominal bilateral exchange rate of the Malawi kwacha against the US dollar. Parallel exchange rate premium is the difference between official exchange rate and parallel exchange rate.
All variables are expressed in logs except for net sales.
Estimation and Results
Time Series properties of the data
We first conduct a descriptive analysis of the data for the first part of the study. Table 1 shows that the variables do not follow a normal distribution. The second step is to test for unit root in the variables. We may also suspect that the results are reflecting speculation in the foreign exchange market. Typical of small economies, even after a Reserve Bank sale, the dollar tends to quickly dry out on the market due small magnitudes of foreign exchange sales. What happens is that market speculators tend to buy as much foreign exchange as is possible after foreign exchange sales by the Reserve Bank and then withhold the foreign exchange till the exchange rate rises again and then they sell afterwards 7 . This form of speculation may be the result of the fact that since the kwacha was floated in February 2004, the nominal exchange rate has on continuously been on the depreciating trend (from K4.5/US dollar in 1994 to K138.65/US dollar as of end August 2006).
It must however be noted that, while the effect of net sales of foreign exchange on the kwacha is statistically significant, it is not economically significant. In particular, for the full sample period, a US$10 million sales of foreign exchange is associated with a rather 0.05 percent depreciation of the Malawi kwacha. 8
The results also indicate that price differentials between Malawi and South Africa affect the kwacha. As price differentials widen, the kwacha tends to depreciate. It must be noted that South Africa is Malawi's major trading partners with a weight of bout 48 percent. So any price differentials between the two countries have consequent effects on the kwacha.
Similarly, higher exchange rate premium tend to depreciate the kwacha.
We also find that RBM intervention decreases the volatility of the kwacha as evidenced terms are both positive and statistically significant.
Policy Implications and Conclusion
The paper analyses the effectiveness of foreign exchange market interventions carried out by the Reserve Bank of Malawi. The paper uses monthly data of Reserve Bank of Malawi intervention (net sales of foreign exchange), and exchange rate data, among others, over a four year period. We start off by running a conditional mean equation using changes in exchange rate as regressor. The results show the presence of ARCH effects. With the presence of ARCH effects, we then move ahead to run a GARCH (1,1) model by quasimaximum likelihood. In line with similar findings elsewhere in the literature, the paper finds that net sales of dollars by the Reserve Bank of Malawi depreciate, rather than appreciate, the kwacha. This effect is very small however. Moreover, the paper also finds that the Reserve Bank of Malawi intervention reduces the volatility of the kwacha.
This shows that the Reserve Bank of Malawi actually achieves its objective of smoothing out fluctuation of the kwacha. This can be evidenced by the stability of the kwacha in a larger part of 2004. Thus intervention is, to some extent, used as an effective tool for moderating fluctuations of the Malawi kwacha. However, its effectiveness is constrained by the amounts of foreign exchange reserves, which are usually low. In the short-term, therefore, the Bank has to do a lot of balancing in managing the exchange rate to ensure that the achievement of a stable exchange rate, which is good for the economy, does not come at the expense of inflation and the depletion of foreign reserves. In the medium to long-term, efforts must be directed at transforming the economy into a producing and exporting one so that enough foreign exchange is generated to ensure success of foreign exchange interventions.
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